Getting Information on Japan's Higher Education IN ENGLISH
by Charles Jannuzi
If you are limited to researching Japan's higher education (or any other topic about Japan) in English, you will be able to access only a fraction of the information that is available in Japanese on the Japanese WWW. Information in English tends to be out-of-date and incomplete, which leads to the duplication and proliferation of errors in the western/global media.
Still, I have concentrated on English-language sources in my links from this blog out to the wider web, and I have been consistently surprised by the amount of news, information and analysis that is available if you know where and how to look.
Perhaps the most useful are the topical, fresh translations from the Japanese press that make it into the handful of Japan's English-language newspapers and news services. More recently, the web-based news aggregation sites (such as Japan Probe, Japan Today, NewsOnJapan, and Japan Herald) help to make that information even more accessible and discoverable through search of the WWW or news (such as YahooNews).
However, if you wish to pursue more systematic and in-depth research (such as for academic purposes or your own journalism or blog), then the single best source of information on education in Japan is the English-language sections of the website of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT). One problems is that its website is sprawling and confusing to navigate at first. A second weakness is the English-language content is not near as deep or up-to-date as the body of it in Japanese.
The main reason why MEXT's site is a treasure trove of information that goes beyond a lot of other ministries or government departments, both inside and outside Japan, is MEXT's scale. It really is a 'super-ministry', a combination of cabinet-level management of education with huge science budgets and policies.
Here is a list of some of the best English-language pages to search and read for topics related to higher education / tertiary education / further education in Japan.
1. Education English-language front page of MEXT
http://www.mext.go.jp/english/a01.htm
2. Front English-language page of MEXT for Higher Education.
http://www.mext.go.jp/english/koutou/index.htm
3. Stats on Universities and Junior Colleges
http://www.mext.go.jp/english/statist/index11.htm
4. Stats on Colleges of Technology
http://www.mext.go.jp/english/statist/index10.htm
5. Stats on Specialized Training Colleges
http://www.mext.go.jp/english/statist/index12.htm
6. Stats on Miscellaneous Schools
http://www.mext.go.jp/english/statist/index13.htm
7. Stats on Science and Technology
(which MEXT oversees in the national government)
http://www.mext.go.jp/english/kagaku/index.htm
8. Japan's Education at a Glance 2006
(Guide on entire education system,
previous editions can be download as compiled pdfs)
http://www.mext.go.jp/english/statist/07070310.htm
9. Overview of the structure of the MEXT 'super-ministry'
http://www.mext.go.jp/english/org/index.htm
10. Monthly index of MEXT press releases
(the limited English-language ones, not too frequent unfortunately)
http://www.mext.go.jp/english/news/index.htm
11. Database of Statistics on Japan's Higher Education
at the website of the Research Institute for Higher Education,
Hiroshima University (a high-ranked national university).
http://en.rihe.hiroshima-u.ac.jp/data_category.php
02 March 2008
From university research centers to international research hubs?
From university research centers to international research hubs?
by Charles Jannuzi
In the post-bubble Japan of the 1990s, the private sector's ability to finance scientific research and development went into stagnation and then decline. So from 1995 on the government has pursued an expanded role in the management and funding of scientific R&D at annual levels that equal or exceed 1% of GDP. In great part this has been through the dominant role of its super-ministry, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) and its five-year 'Science and Technology Basic Plans'.
In order to increase public subsidy of scientific research-- while at the same time forcing research universities and research institutes to compete for funds--MEXT established a 'Centers of Excellence' program. However, this turned out to be a fairly diffuse program, paying for the construction of dozens of new research facilities all over the country at the former national universities and a handful of elite private ones. While this did a lot to help refurbish the appearance of the visibly deteriorated national universities, its actual boost to important scientific results is questionable.
It seems that the ministry was betting on being able 'to seed' indiscriminately a rather large number of projects in many different fields. Critics pointed out that in the process there had been a lack from the top down of any selectivity or a sense of priorities. The MEXT's even-handed beneficence (at least towards its former national universities and some top private institutions, such as Keio U. and Waseda U.) led to the scatter-shot construction of dozens of relatively small-scale facilities hosted by second-tier institutions.
The subsequent dilution of focus and, more importantly, the total amounts of funding did not impress the greater world community of Big Science. Most of the money went into the physical construction of the facilities as opposed actually to funding research. Moreover, it has been difficult for the colleges of science and technology at many universities to staff the new research centers appropriately because they lack long track records of achievement in research. This lack of a history combined with contractual employment seem to be too risky and potentially unstable for many junior careerists.
Under the prerogatives of its third Science and Technology Basic Plan (begun 2006), the MEXT sought to address the issues of a lack of priorities and inadequacy of scale. Most significantly it announced a long-term, deep-pocketed but highly selective program it calls the 'World Premier International Research Center Initiative' (WPIRCI). The WPIRCI was to be a contest that rewarded only FIVE institutions in fiscal year 2007. But the winners will get at least ten years of support (with five year renewals based on documented results). And the funding totals could approach a figure close to USD $60 million. Most importantly, since some support has to come from the host institutions, much of the new funding may actually go towards high-priority research and not be completely exhausted on the construction of new facilities.
The results of the competition were announced and explained in late 2007, with some updates appearing last month (Feb. 2008) . For those who follow scientific research at the (former) national universities and (the former) national research institutes in Japan, the results were quite predictable. Japan's top-ranked research universities, whose establishment goes back to the old imperial system, are the winners. They are Tokyo University, Kyoto University, Tohoku University and Osaka University. The former national research institute, The National Institute for Materials Science (NIMS), will also host a new center. NIMS's work in nano-technology and nano-architechtonics is done in partnership with still yet another former national university, University of Tsukuba (a new science university that does not have imperial system roots).
Although the new centers will be hosted by long-established research institutions, they are supposed to break from tradition in at least two ways. First, research and operations will have English as their official language (even if this proves to be impossible in Japan). And they must hire at least 20% foreign nationals. Most likely many of these will be chosen from the foreign nationals already at the institutions doing doctoral or post-doctoral work. Presumably even some Japanese nationals will be forced into a contractual personnel system, with contracts being 5 or 7 years.
According to updated information recently posted at the website of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) <http://www.jsps.go.jp/english/index.html>
the results are:
1. Tohoku University - WPI Advanced Institute for Materials Research
2. The University of Tokyo - Institute for the Physics and Mathematics of the Universe
3. Kyoto University - Institute for Integrated Cell-Material Sciences
4. Osaka University - Immunology Frontier Research Center
5. National Institute for Materials Science (NIMS) - International Center for Materials Nanoarchitectonics
by Charles Jannuzi
In the post-bubble Japan of the 1990s, the private sector's ability to finance scientific research and development went into stagnation and then decline. So from 1995 on the government has pursued an expanded role in the management and funding of scientific R&D at annual levels that equal or exceed 1% of GDP. In great part this has been through the dominant role of its super-ministry, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) and its five-year 'Science and Technology Basic Plans'.
In order to increase public subsidy of scientific research-- while at the same time forcing research universities and research institutes to compete for funds--MEXT established a 'Centers of Excellence' program. However, this turned out to be a fairly diffuse program, paying for the construction of dozens of new research facilities all over the country at the former national universities and a handful of elite private ones. While this did a lot to help refurbish the appearance of the visibly deteriorated national universities, its actual boost to important scientific results is questionable.
It seems that the ministry was betting on being able 'to seed' indiscriminately a rather large number of projects in many different fields. Critics pointed out that in the process there had been a lack from the top down of any selectivity or a sense of priorities. The MEXT's even-handed beneficence (at least towards its former national universities and some top private institutions, such as Keio U. and Waseda U.) led to the scatter-shot construction of dozens of relatively small-scale facilities hosted by second-tier institutions.
The subsequent dilution of focus and, more importantly, the total amounts of funding did not impress the greater world community of Big Science. Most of the money went into the physical construction of the facilities as opposed actually to funding research. Moreover, it has been difficult for the colleges of science and technology at many universities to staff the new research centers appropriately because they lack long track records of achievement in research. This lack of a history combined with contractual employment seem to be too risky and potentially unstable for many junior careerists.
Under the prerogatives of its third Science and Technology Basic Plan (begun 2006), the MEXT sought to address the issues of a lack of priorities and inadequacy of scale. Most significantly it announced a long-term, deep-pocketed but highly selective program it calls the 'World Premier International Research Center Initiative' (WPIRCI). The WPIRCI was to be a contest that rewarded only FIVE institutions in fiscal year 2007. But the winners will get at least ten years of support (with five year renewals based on documented results). And the funding totals could approach a figure close to USD $60 million. Most importantly, since some support has to come from the host institutions, much of the new funding may actually go towards high-priority research and not be completely exhausted on the construction of new facilities.
The results of the competition were announced and explained in late 2007, with some updates appearing last month (Feb. 2008) . For those who follow scientific research at the (former) national universities and (the former) national research institutes in Japan, the results were quite predictable. Japan's top-ranked research universities, whose establishment goes back to the old imperial system, are the winners. They are Tokyo University, Kyoto University, Tohoku University and Osaka University. The former national research institute, The National Institute for Materials Science (NIMS), will also host a new center. NIMS's work in nano-technology and nano-architechtonics is done in partnership with still yet another former national university, University of Tsukuba (a new science university that does not have imperial system roots).
Although the new centers will be hosted by long-established research institutions, they are supposed to break from tradition in at least two ways. First, research and operations will have English as their official language (even if this proves to be impossible in Japan). And they must hire at least 20% foreign nationals. Most likely many of these will be chosen from the foreign nationals already at the institutions doing doctoral or post-doctoral work. Presumably even some Japanese nationals will be forced into a contractual personnel system, with contracts being 5 or 7 years.
According to updated information recently posted at the website of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) <http://www.jsps.go.jp/english/index.html>
the results are:
1. Tohoku University - WPI Advanced Institute for Materials Research
2. The University of Tokyo - Institute for the Physics and Mathematics of the Universe
3. Kyoto University - Institute for Integrated Cell-Material Sciences
4. Osaka University - Immunology Frontier Research Center
5. National Institute for Materials Science (NIMS) - International Center for Materials Nanoarchitectonics
23 February 2008
End of Japan's National Development State for Higher Education
This is an expanded version of an article that was previously published here at the JHEO.
The new version appears at MRZINE online. Here is an excerpt. The rest can be read at the MRZINE site.
End of Japan's National Development State for Higher Education
by Charles Jannuzi
Introduction
Japan's vast higher education system has around 5,000 institutions. This includes a tertiary level of about 1,300 government-approved, degree-awarding colleges and universities. Seven hundred forty-five of these are designated as 'daigaku,' a term which refers to any institution that has received government sanction to award four-year degrees equivalent to a baccalaureate. These four-year universities along with junior and technical colleges enroll close to three million undergraduate students, including about 120,000 foreign nationals, the vast majority of whom are from China.
Rest of the article is at MRZINE online:
http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/jannuzi200208.html
The new version appears at MRZINE online. Here is an excerpt. The rest can be read at the MRZINE site.
End of Japan's National Development State for Higher Education
by Charles Jannuzi
Introduction
Japan's vast higher education system has around 5,000 institutions. This includes a tertiary level of about 1,300 government-approved, degree-awarding colleges and universities. Seven hundred forty-five of these are designated as 'daigaku,' a term which refers to any institution that has received government sanction to award four-year degrees equivalent to a baccalaureate. These four-year universities along with junior and technical colleges enroll close to three million undergraduate students, including about 120,000 foreign nationals, the vast majority of whom are from China.
Rest of the article is at MRZINE online:
http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/jannuzi200208.html
13 February 2008
FACTOID #1: How many universities are there in Japan?
FACTOID #1: How many universities are there in Japan?
This is the first of an occasional 'factoid' series on higher education in Japan. I will try to go beyond the mere facts and analyze some of the reality that lies beneath.
Question: How many universities are there in Japan?
Answer: Depending on which government data source you use, there are 744 or 745 'universities'.
However, this has to be qualified because there is an issue that arises with meanings and translations. In Japanese, the term 'daigaku' usually means any government-chartered institution that has been certified to issue four-year undergraduate degrees.
The term 'daigaku' then gets translated as 'university', but it could also mean a four-year college in Japan (similar to one American sense of the word, such as a 'small liberal arts college'). So a considerable number of daigaku are really only colleges with few courses of study leading to a four-year degree (the equivalent of a 'bachelor's').
Despite a severe decline in the populations of senior high graduates (typically, 18 year olds) over the past decade and a half, the number of government-approved 'daigaku' in Japan continues to grow. These cohorts have fallen steadily from over two million in the early 90s to just over one million now. Much to the relief of higher education institutions, this population has started to level off and won't face steep declines again until the year 2020 (the real year of reckoning for Japan's over-built higher education sector).
So for a while yet, the number of daigaku looks set to increase at least slightly as many of the troubled 'tanki daigaku'--two-year junior colleges--go through a laborious process with the ministry of education and re-emerge certified to run four-year programs. It also makes economic sense to the business planners of institutions for two reasons: (1) more young women choose or are allowed to go to college for four years instead of the traditional two. (2) And if high school or college-eligible populations are dropping or leveling off at a number too low for the financial bottom line, then keeping students enrolled for two or more years helps that bottom line.
Even as I write this and you read this, there are probably two-year institutions getting ready to debut as four-year 'daigaku' as of 1 April this year (the school year in Japan begins then).
While the number of four-year colleges continues to grow, it must be said that the majority of 'daigaku' in Japan should be called universities because they include several colleges (and their faculties) and offer a fairly wide range of majors and specialties. The majority are also private universities, enrolling around 75% of undergraduates. But that will serve for another factoid in this series (That is, "Are there private universities in Japan?").
This is the first of an occasional 'factoid' series on higher education in Japan. I will try to go beyond the mere facts and analyze some of the reality that lies beneath.
Question: How many universities are there in Japan?
Answer: Depending on which government data source you use, there are 744 or 745 'universities'.
However, this has to be qualified because there is an issue that arises with meanings and translations. In Japanese, the term 'daigaku' usually means any government-chartered institution that has been certified to issue four-year undergraduate degrees.
The term 'daigaku' then gets translated as 'university', but it could also mean a four-year college in Japan (similar to one American sense of the word, such as a 'small liberal arts college'). So a considerable number of daigaku are really only colleges with few courses of study leading to a four-year degree (the equivalent of a 'bachelor's').
Despite a severe decline in the populations of senior high graduates (typically, 18 year olds) over the past decade and a half, the number of government-approved 'daigaku' in Japan continues to grow. These cohorts have fallen steadily from over two million in the early 90s to just over one million now. Much to the relief of higher education institutions, this population has started to level off and won't face steep declines again until the year 2020 (the real year of reckoning for Japan's over-built higher education sector).
So for a while yet, the number of daigaku looks set to increase at least slightly as many of the troubled 'tanki daigaku'--two-year junior colleges--go through a laborious process with the ministry of education and re-emerge certified to run four-year programs. It also makes economic sense to the business planners of institutions for two reasons: (1) more young women choose or are allowed to go to college for four years instead of the traditional two. (2) And if high school or college-eligible populations are dropping or leveling off at a number too low for the financial bottom line, then keeping students enrolled for two or more years helps that bottom line.
Even as I write this and you read this, there are probably two-year institutions getting ready to debut as four-year 'daigaku' as of 1 April this year (the school year in Japan begins then).
While the number of four-year colleges continues to grow, it must be said that the majority of 'daigaku' in Japan should be called universities because they include several colleges (and their faculties) and offer a fairly wide range of majors and specialties. The majority are also private universities, enrolling around 75% of undergraduates. But that will serve for another factoid in this series (That is, "Are there private universities in Japan?").
FACTOID #2: Are universities and colleges in Japan accredited?
This factoid dated quickly. It was published in early 2008 but mostly based on information from 2004-7. It would appear most are now accredited by one of the four accrediting agencies and we are well into cycles of re-accreditation. However, as to how meaningful it is and how the role of the national government has changed (or not), these are not so clear. JPNHEO blog still stands by its criticisms of generic , American-style accreditation.
See this exchange as an update to this piece:
http://japanheo.blogspot.com/2011/08/reply-to-taikibansei-on-factoid-2-are.html
http://japanheo.blogspot.com/2011/08/reply-to-taikibansei-on-reply-to.html
FACTOID #2: Are universities and colleges in Japan accredited?
Question: Are universities and colleges in Japan accredited?
Answer: They could be, but most are not--not yet, anyway.
In theory, certified tertiary institutions (universities, junior colleges, colleges of technology) could be accredited. But very few institutions or programs have actually undergone external evaluation and accreditation. Even this limited activity is a fairly recent phenomenon because accreditation was switched from voluntary to mandatory.
Japan's political economy is structured around a centralized national government, which attempts to exert control across the entire country from the top on down to the lowest level of government. The higher education sector is no exception. Institutions can run taught programs and issue degrees because they have gone through a time-consuming, laborious process of registering with the national government. The more government money an institution takes (such as the former national and public universities), the more direct the control of the government is.
The concept of accreditation in the way Americans think of it has little meaning in Japan. For example, Temple University of Japan (TUJ) has never bothered to register with the national government as a domestic institution, citing costs and interference with its autonomy over curriculum. Yet it asserts that the accreditation which Temple University in the US has also applies as a mark of quality over its programs and courses in Japan. That is a dubious proposition at best. But that has more to do with the problems of American-style accreditation than with Temple University or TUJ. Also, under the current era of reform, the Japanese government has conceded to TUJ the right to have its degrees recognized in Japan.
American-style accreditation has not yet been a major factor in standardization and quality assurance at universities and colleges in Japan. The national government and its ministry of education had required that universities and colleges conduct internal review of their programs and operations and report the results. The term 'external audit' in the case of a private university would most likely mean an accounting audit to satisfy the board of directors or the tax office.
Japan's School Education Act was amended in 2002, with a new mandatory accreditation scheme starting in 2004. The government certified a handful of accreditation organizations, and all public and private universities, junior colleges, and colleges of technology are now required to undergo the accreditation process every seven years. So accreditation of entire institutions or at least some of their programs could soon be a major factor in higher education.
Between 2004-2007 a small fraction of Japan's total certified higher education institutions underwent accreditation as sort of a pilot program. And now the national government is forcing the former national universities into an external review process administered by the four existing accrediting agencies.
Still, until the outcomes of the first external review process become clear in the next several years and until all institutions can join the accreditation process, the national government is the single source of 'legitimacy' for universities and colleges. Besides, confusingly enough, it now certifies the accrediting agencies. And tertiary institutions can issue degrees, certificates and diplomas only because the national government approves and certifies them. The government also sets enrollment quotas for all certified universities and colleges.
It is also uncertain whether or not American-style accreditation processes can validly and reliably assess Japanese institutions. Actually, it is not even certain if what the government here has in mind is American-style accreditation. It appears to be a mix of both top-down government roles of the sort American institutions would never abide combined with non-government accreditating agencies, the oldest of which goes back to the Occupation (namely, the Japan University Accreditation Association).
In 1947-8 the American Occupation attempted to establish American-style accreditation when it controlled the entire education system of Japan and pushed educational reform as a way of 'fixing' what Americans thought was wrong with the imperial Japan it had defeated. But the nationalist conservatives who run the Japanese government, once given the chance to rule, always asserted their right to control the university system as an integral part of national and territorial sovereignty.
It should also be pointed out that American-style accreditation is not understood well outside of Anglo-North America and is not inherently 'universal'. It would seem the concept confuses many Americans as well. An American institution does not have the legal right to issue a valid degree because of accreditation but rather its charter with its respective state government. Japan doesn't have state governments, and the prefectural governments are more on the scale of the county in the US.
But most importantly, it has to be asked: Has American-style accreditation even kept up with the US's hypertrophied higher education, let alone proven to be a model for other countries? Is it really an assurance of quality for highly technical programs or innovative ones in emergent fields? Can it assess new modes of delivery (such as modular study done through distance learning over the internet and WWW)?
At any rate, the four official accrediting agencies that are going to become busy in the next several years, as hundreds, if not thousands, of universities and colleges undergo the accreditation process are the following:
(1) National Institution for Academic Degrees and University Evaluation (NIAD-UE)
(2) Japan University Accreditation Association (JUAA)
(3) Japan Institution for Higher Education Evaluation (JIHEE)
(4) Japan Association for College Accreditation (JACA)
There is also the non-government Japan Accreditation Board for Engineering Education (JABEE). This organization bears mentioning because of the large number of engineering programs at universities in Japan, both national and private.
What Japan really needs is certification and accreditation standards that fit the needs of the 100,000 plus students from China, E. Asia and S.E. Asia now completing degrees and certificates in higher education. The educational authorities and policy makers in Japan ought to be discussing harmonization for credits, certificates and degrees with China, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. For example, why not an all-Asian set of standards for degree-level qualifications in engineering? And what universities worldwide need are systems of accreditation that mesh with government policies in education, but are capable of assessing quality over diversifying modes of delivery and very specific specialities. .
See this exchange as an update to this piece:
http://japanheo.blogspot.com/2011/08/reply-to-taikibansei-on-factoid-2-are.html
http://japanheo.blogspot.com/2011/08/reply-to-taikibansei-on-reply-to.html
FACTOID #2: Are universities and colleges in Japan accredited?
Question: Are universities and colleges in Japan accredited?
Answer: They could be, but most are not--not yet, anyway.
In theory, certified tertiary institutions (universities, junior colleges, colleges of technology) could be accredited. But very few institutions or programs have actually undergone external evaluation and accreditation. Even this limited activity is a fairly recent phenomenon because accreditation was switched from voluntary to mandatory.
Japan's political economy is structured around a centralized national government, which attempts to exert control across the entire country from the top on down to the lowest level of government. The higher education sector is no exception. Institutions can run taught programs and issue degrees because they have gone through a time-consuming, laborious process of registering with the national government. The more government money an institution takes (such as the former national and public universities), the more direct the control of the government is.
The concept of accreditation in the way Americans think of it has little meaning in Japan. For example, Temple University of Japan (TUJ) has never bothered to register with the national government as a domestic institution, citing costs and interference with its autonomy over curriculum. Yet it asserts that the accreditation which Temple University in the US has also applies as a mark of quality over its programs and courses in Japan. That is a dubious proposition at best. But that has more to do with the problems of American-style accreditation than with Temple University or TUJ. Also, under the current era of reform, the Japanese government has conceded to TUJ the right to have its degrees recognized in Japan.
American-style accreditation has not yet been a major factor in standardization and quality assurance at universities and colleges in Japan. The national government and its ministry of education had required that universities and colleges conduct internal review of their programs and operations and report the results. The term 'external audit' in the case of a private university would most likely mean an accounting audit to satisfy the board of directors or the tax office.
Japan's School Education Act was amended in 2002, with a new mandatory accreditation scheme starting in 2004. The government certified a handful of accreditation organizations, and all public and private universities, junior colleges, and colleges of technology are now required to undergo the accreditation process every seven years. So accreditation of entire institutions or at least some of their programs could soon be a major factor in higher education.
Between 2004-2007 a small fraction of Japan's total certified higher education institutions underwent accreditation as sort of a pilot program. And now the national government is forcing the former national universities into an external review process administered by the four existing accrediting agencies.
Still, until the outcomes of the first external review process become clear in the next several years and until all institutions can join the accreditation process, the national government is the single source of 'legitimacy' for universities and colleges. Besides, confusingly enough, it now certifies the accrediting agencies. And tertiary institutions can issue degrees, certificates and diplomas only because the national government approves and certifies them. The government also sets enrollment quotas for all certified universities and colleges.
It is also uncertain whether or not American-style accreditation processes can validly and reliably assess Japanese institutions. Actually, it is not even certain if what the government here has in mind is American-style accreditation. It appears to be a mix of both top-down government roles of the sort American institutions would never abide combined with non-government accreditating agencies, the oldest of which goes back to the Occupation (namely, the Japan University Accreditation Association).
In 1947-8 the American Occupation attempted to establish American-style accreditation when it controlled the entire education system of Japan and pushed educational reform as a way of 'fixing' what Americans thought was wrong with the imperial Japan it had defeated. But the nationalist conservatives who run the Japanese government, once given the chance to rule, always asserted their right to control the university system as an integral part of national and territorial sovereignty.
It should also be pointed out that American-style accreditation is not understood well outside of Anglo-North America and is not inherently 'universal'. It would seem the concept confuses many Americans as well. An American institution does not have the legal right to issue a valid degree because of accreditation but rather its charter with its respective state government. Japan doesn't have state governments, and the prefectural governments are more on the scale of the county in the US.
But most importantly, it has to be asked: Has American-style accreditation even kept up with the US's hypertrophied higher education, let alone proven to be a model for other countries? Is it really an assurance of quality for highly technical programs or innovative ones in emergent fields? Can it assess new modes of delivery (such as modular study done through distance learning over the internet and WWW)?
At any rate, the four official accrediting agencies that are going to become busy in the next several years, as hundreds, if not thousands, of universities and colleges undergo the accreditation process are the following:
(1) National Institution for Academic Degrees and University Evaluation (NIAD-UE)
(2) Japan University Accreditation Association (JUAA)
(3) Japan Institution for Higher Education Evaluation (JIHEE)
(4) Japan Association for College Accreditation (JACA)
There is also the non-government Japan Accreditation Board for Engineering Education (JABEE). This organization bears mentioning because of the large number of engineering programs at universities in Japan, both national and private.
What Japan really needs is certification and accreditation standards that fit the needs of the 100,000 plus students from China, E. Asia and S.E. Asia now completing degrees and certificates in higher education. The educational authorities and policy makers in Japan ought to be discussing harmonization for credits, certificates and degrees with China, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. For example, why not an all-Asian set of standards for degree-level qualifications in engineering? And what universities worldwide need are systems of accreditation that mesh with government policies in education, but are capable of assessing quality over diversifying modes of delivery and very specific specialities. .
10 February 2008
Demographic Disaster for Higher Ed in Japan? Part I
Demographic Disaster for Higher Education in Japan?
Part I
by Charles Jannuzi
Introduction
This will be a three-part series for the Japan HEO Blog. This first installment will be a short introduction of the series and then follow with an analysis of Anglophone news coverage of Japan. This is, after all, an English-language blog on Japan.
Part two will consist of analysis of recent articles which appeared in the FT, New York Times, Guardian and Kyodo News Service which have covered the 'demographic disaster' that is supposed to be looming over higher education in Japan. Going straight to the strong points of the argument for a disaster scenario for HE in Japan, I will try to point out some of the flaws and gaps in the analysis.
The third and final part, which will most likely appear late in March 2008 (when the single correspondent of the Japan HEO Blog doesn't have to teach classes), I will put forth a different analysis in an attempt to answer the puzzling question, "Why, if high school graduate and university-eligible populations are in steady and unrecoverable decline, is Japan building still yet more universities?" Does someone in the HE sector here know something that everyone else doesn't? Or are they delusional?
Representational stereotypes and monomaniacal theses
When Japan gets covered in the English-language media there have been and there continues to be the following tendencies:
1. Japan as perfected capitalism.
In the run up to the era of 'big bang' deregulation and globalization, American business figures and journalists would often present Japan to American audiences as some sort of contrasting ideal in management practices, government-business-labor relations, and quality control of industrial production. America was supposed to learn from the Japanese how to make better products.
This pattern of representation has largely passed. For one thing, I think the historical consensus is that American companies will never be able to make automobiles to match Japanese or European ones. To be fair to America, one could point out that America pioneered modern aircraft production to go along with air travel on the scale that makes world tourism possible (even though much of this has been subsidized by the US's commitment to keeping an overly large military projecting naval power and air power, quartered all over the world) .
2. Japan as failed capitalism, just waiting to sink into the Pacific Ocean.
One variation of this thesis says that Japan was never really free-market capitalist in the first place. It only succeeded because the US sponsored it as its 'island battleship' against communism on the Asian mainland. Alternatively, Japan became an industrialized, developed, affluent country by practicing predatory mercantilism.
These variations lead to all sorts of convoluted but poorly thought out arguments because it is either pro-capitalist, free market liberals who end up making such arguments about Japan or trade-protectionist, nationalist populists. This leads to the conclusion that mercantilism is wrong (or right), bad (or good), predatory (or self-preservationist) and does (or doesn't work)-- depending on whether you are an economic liberal or an economic nationalist. The economic nationalists tend toward populism, strong state interventionism, even militarism and, at least in theory, fascism in proposing solutions to their perceived national malaise.
At any rate, such monomaniacal theses about Japan are almost an industry among a set of under-worked, over-educated American academics and intellectual-type journalists dead set on committing metaphysical suicide.
Still, the least complicated version of this line of reasoning goes like this:
Since 1989 the Japanese just can't seem to do anything right. They couldn't match the productivity gains or the profitability of dynamic go-go US capitalism (especially in high tech and in the service sector). It's only a matter of time before Japan COLLAPSES.
This representation of Japan in the English-language press has had over a decade of popularity. But as it has turned out (drearily, predictably), US gains in productivity were largely a phantom effect of an economy taken over by speculative bubbles in just about any asset class that exists or could be created.
The fallacy of this sort of analysis is really just the mirror image of the number 1 above. For you see, one reason why Japan looked like such a successful case of capitalism in the 1980s was its speculative bubble economy, which came to a crashing end in that period 1989-1992.
The US is finding out that cheap money, speculative investing--combined with a large whack of military Keynesianism--can indeed produce short-term profitability but not for the historic long term. One can only hope that the management gurus and business writers don't try to revive Japan as a model for reforming post-bubble, post-Bush America.
3. Japan as an ancient, ineffable, exotic Asian culture.
Given the popularity and prevalence of such an approach to writing about Japan, this might seem to be a sure-fire way to sell freelance pieces. But having lived here for over 18 years, I find myself totally incapable of producing this sort of representation of the country. In fact, since my first week in Japan (spent in Shinjuku, Tokyo, in late July 1989, in order to be inducted onto the JET Programme), I have found myself completely unable to write this sort of stuff about Japan. I have never claimed to be any good at fantasy fiction, as much as I enjoy reading it sometimes.
What undercuts any depiction of Japan the exotic is Japan as most have to live it. The country is a resource-poor, over-populated, over-developed, industrialized, now post-industrial nation. For those who live here, except for some remote parts and some artificially created urban pockets, the country is the last thing from ancient or exotic. Much of what people both in this culture and from outside it perceive as ancient are the creations of Meiji Era nationalists.
Perhaps the ideologically exotic aspect that I CAN isolate is this: Japan is a developed, affluent, bourgeois nation but isn't in its core tradition, CHRISTIAN. So much for the Weberian thesis about the Protestant work ethic perhaps? No, Japan is Confucian, Buddhist, and both state and native Shinto (with ethics being a complete, seamless, practical fusion of all these, with a dose of Taoism thrown into the mix). This can really flummox the bourgeoisie of North America, UK or Australia when they encounter Japan as it is.
4. Japan as a strange, even goofy fantasy land of ridiculous people.
This is sort of a corollary of numbers 2 and 3 above. It is essentially chauvinist (if not all out racist) and sees Japan in inferior terms, the butt of jokes among the OECD members club. But such racism neuters Japan and plays down its potential harmfulness as an 'out nation' and 'rogue state' in the Christian bourgeois, free market universe. It also doesn't relentlessly lead to some conclusion that Japan will fail and end up in the dust bin of western bourgeois-written histories.
Japan and Japanese are simply here for our amusement. Laugh at them in all their ridiculousness.
At least in the case of the US (and perhaps Canada), the thing that most undercuts this sort of view is BASEBALL (not sumo). If Japan is such a goofy, funny country, how did they produce Ichiro and Daisuke? Was it steroids, human growth hormone and off-season weight training with Clemens? Still, if you want to sell a freelance piece about Japan, NEVER, EVER underestimate the willingness of editors to buy and readers to consume this sort of nonsense.
Conclusion and a look ahead to Part Two
I have argued that western and foreign views about Japan tend to fall into discernible patterns, which I have attempted to outline above. I would also argue that part of the reason so much outside analysis of Japan gets stuck on such monomaniacal, pseudo-social scientific nonsense is that the Japanese themselves are responsible. (Contributing to this though is the American penchant for believing in so much pseudo-social scientific nonsense, much of it they 'learned' at university.)
My sense is that most Japanese have little understanding of the nations and cultures they trade with, including their preferred 'Anglophone' partners (US, Canada, UK, Australia, New Zealand), Europe or the rest of Asia. This makes the Japanese true citizens of this troubled world. Also, many Japanese really do think that their country is 'uniquely unique', even as they marvel at how weird, strange and dangerous other countries and cultures are when contrasted to the 'civilized normality' of their own.
It could also be said that much of what outsiders do in shaping stereotypes of Japan is simply what outsiders do to all the countries and cultures they experience but barely understand (because of the language and cross-cultural bottlenecks to the exchange of real information and knowledge).
In the case of the 'demographic decline' trend for HE in Japan, the problem is we get locked into obsessively uninformed analysis of Japan. Any thesis that says that the higher ed sector in Japan is going to collapse--along with the rest of the country--because all Japanese women only bear 1.3 children in their lifetimes isn't going to make for very interesting or informative analysis. After all, Japan's higher education is actually STILL EXPANDING. And most institutions are planning on surviving and taking steps accordingly. In the next installment--Part II--we will look at the FT, NYT, Guardian, and Kyodo articles and see how their analysis is blinded by stereotypes and flawed by a lack of real information about Japan and its higher education.
Part I
by Charles Jannuzi
Introduction
This will be a three-part series for the Japan HEO Blog. This first installment will be a short introduction of the series and then follow with an analysis of Anglophone news coverage of Japan. This is, after all, an English-language blog on Japan.
Part two will consist of analysis of recent articles which appeared in the FT, New York Times, Guardian and Kyodo News Service which have covered the 'demographic disaster' that is supposed to be looming over higher education in Japan. Going straight to the strong points of the argument for a disaster scenario for HE in Japan, I will try to point out some of the flaws and gaps in the analysis.
The third and final part, which will most likely appear late in March 2008 (when the single correspondent of the Japan HEO Blog doesn't have to teach classes), I will put forth a different analysis in an attempt to answer the puzzling question, "Why, if high school graduate and university-eligible populations are in steady and unrecoverable decline, is Japan building still yet more universities?" Does someone in the HE sector here know something that everyone else doesn't? Or are they delusional?
Representational stereotypes and monomaniacal theses
When Japan gets covered in the English-language media there have been and there continues to be the following tendencies:
1. Japan as perfected capitalism.
In the run up to the era of 'big bang' deregulation and globalization, American business figures and journalists would often present Japan to American audiences as some sort of contrasting ideal in management practices, government-business-labor relations, and quality control of industrial production. America was supposed to learn from the Japanese how to make better products.
This pattern of representation has largely passed. For one thing, I think the historical consensus is that American companies will never be able to make automobiles to match Japanese or European ones. To be fair to America, one could point out that America pioneered modern aircraft production to go along with air travel on the scale that makes world tourism possible (even though much of this has been subsidized by the US's commitment to keeping an overly large military projecting naval power and air power, quartered all over the world) .
2. Japan as failed capitalism, just waiting to sink into the Pacific Ocean.
One variation of this thesis says that Japan was never really free-market capitalist in the first place. It only succeeded because the US sponsored it as its 'island battleship' against communism on the Asian mainland. Alternatively, Japan became an industrialized, developed, affluent country by practicing predatory mercantilism.
These variations lead to all sorts of convoluted but poorly thought out arguments because it is either pro-capitalist, free market liberals who end up making such arguments about Japan or trade-protectionist, nationalist populists. This leads to the conclusion that mercantilism is wrong (or right), bad (or good), predatory (or self-preservationist) and does (or doesn't work)-- depending on whether you are an economic liberal or an economic nationalist. The economic nationalists tend toward populism, strong state interventionism, even militarism and, at least in theory, fascism in proposing solutions to their perceived national malaise.
At any rate, such monomaniacal theses about Japan are almost an industry among a set of under-worked, over-educated American academics and intellectual-type journalists dead set on committing metaphysical suicide.
Still, the least complicated version of this line of reasoning goes like this:
Since 1989 the Japanese just can't seem to do anything right. They couldn't match the productivity gains or the profitability of dynamic go-go US capitalism (especially in high tech and in the service sector). It's only a matter of time before Japan COLLAPSES.
This representation of Japan in the English-language press has had over a decade of popularity. But as it has turned out (drearily, predictably), US gains in productivity were largely a phantom effect of an economy taken over by speculative bubbles in just about any asset class that exists or could be created.
The fallacy of this sort of analysis is really just the mirror image of the number 1 above. For you see, one reason why Japan looked like such a successful case of capitalism in the 1980s was its speculative bubble economy, which came to a crashing end in that period 1989-1992.
The US is finding out that cheap money, speculative investing--combined with a large whack of military Keynesianism--can indeed produce short-term profitability but not for the historic long term. One can only hope that the management gurus and business writers don't try to revive Japan as a model for reforming post-bubble, post-Bush America.
3. Japan as an ancient, ineffable, exotic Asian culture.
Given the popularity and prevalence of such an approach to writing about Japan, this might seem to be a sure-fire way to sell freelance pieces. But having lived here for over 18 years, I find myself totally incapable of producing this sort of representation of the country. In fact, since my first week in Japan (spent in Shinjuku, Tokyo, in late July 1989, in order to be inducted onto the JET Programme), I have found myself completely unable to write this sort of stuff about Japan. I have never claimed to be any good at fantasy fiction, as much as I enjoy reading it sometimes.
What undercuts any depiction of Japan the exotic is Japan as most have to live it. The country is a resource-poor, over-populated, over-developed, industrialized, now post-industrial nation. For those who live here, except for some remote parts and some artificially created urban pockets, the country is the last thing from ancient or exotic. Much of what people both in this culture and from outside it perceive as ancient are the creations of Meiji Era nationalists.
Perhaps the ideologically exotic aspect that I CAN isolate is this: Japan is a developed, affluent, bourgeois nation but isn't in its core tradition, CHRISTIAN. So much for the Weberian thesis about the Protestant work ethic perhaps? No, Japan is Confucian, Buddhist, and both state and native Shinto (with ethics being a complete, seamless, practical fusion of all these, with a dose of Taoism thrown into the mix). This can really flummox the bourgeoisie of North America, UK or Australia when they encounter Japan as it is.
4. Japan as a strange, even goofy fantasy land of ridiculous people.
This is sort of a corollary of numbers 2 and 3 above. It is essentially chauvinist (if not all out racist) and sees Japan in inferior terms, the butt of jokes among the OECD members club. But such racism neuters Japan and plays down its potential harmfulness as an 'out nation' and 'rogue state' in the Christian bourgeois, free market universe. It also doesn't relentlessly lead to some conclusion that Japan will fail and end up in the dust bin of western bourgeois-written histories.
Japan and Japanese are simply here for our amusement. Laugh at them in all their ridiculousness.
At least in the case of the US (and perhaps Canada), the thing that most undercuts this sort of view is BASEBALL (not sumo). If Japan is such a goofy, funny country, how did they produce Ichiro and Daisuke? Was it steroids, human growth hormone and off-season weight training with Clemens? Still, if you want to sell a freelance piece about Japan, NEVER, EVER underestimate the willingness of editors to buy and readers to consume this sort of nonsense.
Conclusion and a look ahead to Part Two
I have argued that western and foreign views about Japan tend to fall into discernible patterns, which I have attempted to outline above. I would also argue that part of the reason so much outside analysis of Japan gets stuck on such monomaniacal, pseudo-social scientific nonsense is that the Japanese themselves are responsible. (Contributing to this though is the American penchant for believing in so much pseudo-social scientific nonsense, much of it they 'learned' at university.)
My sense is that most Japanese have little understanding of the nations and cultures they trade with, including their preferred 'Anglophone' partners (US, Canada, UK, Australia, New Zealand), Europe or the rest of Asia. This makes the Japanese true citizens of this troubled world. Also, many Japanese really do think that their country is 'uniquely unique', even as they marvel at how weird, strange and dangerous other countries and cultures are when contrasted to the 'civilized normality' of their own.
It could also be said that much of what outsiders do in shaping stereotypes of Japan is simply what outsiders do to all the countries and cultures they experience but barely understand (because of the language and cross-cultural bottlenecks to the exchange of real information and knowledge).
In the case of the 'demographic decline' trend for HE in Japan, the problem is we get locked into obsessively uninformed analysis of Japan. Any thesis that says that the higher ed sector in Japan is going to collapse--along with the rest of the country--because all Japanese women only bear 1.3 children in their lifetimes isn't going to make for very interesting or informative analysis. After all, Japan's higher education is actually STILL EXPANDING. And most institutions are planning on surviving and taking steps accordingly. In the next installment--Part II--we will look at the FT, NYT, Guardian, and Kyodo articles and see how their analysis is blinded by stereotypes and flawed by a lack of real information about Japan and its higher education.
08 February 2008
Cache of Japan HE articles at THES
At least for a while, it appears Times Higher Education Supplement, which recently re-launched its online presence, is making its archived news content available for free.
The following link is actually a search of the archive which I did using my name, 'Jannuzi', as the search term. It called up 17 articles that I wrote for THES between 2000-2006.
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/search_results.asp?qkeyword=jannuzi&categories=0§ions=0&issue=0&x=230&y=84
The articles of 2005-6 are for the most part still current. The analysis articles on the reform and re-chartering of Japan's national universities, which appeared in 2000-1, prove surprisingly predictive and accurate given the limited information I had to work with at the time.
I plan to draw on some of these past articles for future discussions at the Japan Higher Education Outlook Blog in the near future.
The following link is actually a search of the archive which I did using my name, 'Jannuzi', as the search term. It called up 17 articles that I wrote for THES between 2000-2006.
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/search_results.asp?qkeyword=jannuzi&categories=0§ions=0&issue=0&x=230&y=84
The articles of 2005-6 are for the most part still current. The analysis articles on the reform and re-chartering of Japan's national universities, which appeared in 2000-1, prove surprisingly predictive and accurate given the limited information I had to work with at the time.
I plan to draw on some of these past articles for future discussions at the Japan Higher Education Outlook Blog in the near future.
05 February 2008
End of the national development state for HE in Japan?
End of the national development state for HE in Japan?
by Charles Jannuzi
Introduction
Japan's vast higher education system includes around 1300 government-certified, degree-awarding institutions, 745 of which are designated as universities (that is, awarding 4-year degrees). This system enrolls close to 3 million undergraduate students, including about 120,000 foreign nationals. The national government directly funds and indirectly subsidizes higher education in multiple ways. This fiscal mission ensures that the national government directs how institutions run degree programs and carry out research in science and technology. Any detailed analysis of how public and private monies are used to fund higher education in Japan reveals considerable disparities and complexities across the system, depending most on an institution's type and charter.
Over a decade of economic blahs--and budgetary woes
Japan's government has continued to struggle with a period of low economic growth that started in the early 1990s and is well into its second decade. This period has seen ballooning levels of public debt and government deficits, bringing calls to end the 'national development state' and to reform the country into a mature, services-oriented, consumption-driven economy more in tune with its dominant ally, the US.
Government bets on an improved higher ed sector
Despite such difficulties, the national government has remained committed to subsidizing higher education because it falls under both education and science. Much hope for reform of Japan's society and political economy is pinned on improvements in these two areas.
Somewhere between 8-10% of the annual national budget goes to the category of 'education and science'. Statements of exact amounts for the past decade vary by year, source, definitions, and exchange rates, but this 'super category' of expenditure can be estimated to be perennially over US$ 60 billion. Again, depending upon definitions, all forms of education that are post-secondary probably receive close to 40% of this, an amount that could be put at close to US$ 25 billion.
The national government also subsidizes education and higher education through its revenue sharing and tax grants to local government. Local governments nationwide spend about double the amount the national government does on school education, but higher education only captures about 7% of this. Much of this goes to fund the country's 86 public (prefectural or metropolitan) universities.
Former national universities to drive scientific R&D--and economic growth
Another prominent goal has been to spend an amount of public funds on scientific research and development at a level of 1% of GDP. This has benefited universities with research laboratories and centers, especially those within the national university system of 87 institutions. This commitment to scientific research matches in size the 1 - 1.5% of GDP that is annually put towards higher education in total from both public and private sources.
Japan's political economy is structured around a centralized national government, which exerts control across the entire country from the top on down to the lowest of government. The higher education sector is no exception.
American-style accreditation is not yet a major factor in quality assurance. Institutions can issue degrees, certificates and diplomas only because the national government approves and certifies them. The government also sets enrollment quotas for all certified universities and colleges.
In the case of national institutions, the quotas determine the size of bloc grants disbursed annually in support of taught programs. In effect, this means that the top university in Japan, the University of Tokyo, receives the same amount per student from bloc grants as do the handful of tiny national teachers' colleges.
NUCs are born
With an act of legislation that took effect in October 2003, Japan's national universities were re-chartered. Effective 1 April 2004, each university became a national university corporation (NUC). The NUCs are being weaned from annual bloc grants by a reduction of 1% per year. However, they are allowed to raise their tuition fees by a maximum of 10%. This means that eventually the NUCs will charge rates that are similar to private universities. Private institutions make up around 75% of higher education, and their average annual tuition fees of around US$7,400 are about 35% higher than those at national or public institutions.
Can the newly born NUCs adjust and even thrive?
In the next decade, NUCs must scramble to shift their finances to the business operations of their school corporations, deriving funding from the sort of mix that private universities and colleges have long had to live with--higher tuition fees, donations, investments, and revenue-raising activities. Meanwhile, as the NUCs guaranteed share of national education funding is reduced, private universities are sure to increase their efforts to compete for the national funds that are being offered to create an elite 30 world-class universities.
by Charles Jannuzi
Introduction
Japan's vast higher education system includes around 1300 government-certified, degree-awarding institutions, 745 of which are designated as universities (that is, awarding 4-year degrees). This system enrolls close to 3 million undergraduate students, including about 120,000 foreign nationals. The national government directly funds and indirectly subsidizes higher education in multiple ways. This fiscal mission ensures that the national government directs how institutions run degree programs and carry out research in science and technology. Any detailed analysis of how public and private monies are used to fund higher education in Japan reveals considerable disparities and complexities across the system, depending most on an institution's type and charter.
Over a decade of economic blahs--and budgetary woes
Japan's government has continued to struggle with a period of low economic growth that started in the early 1990s and is well into its second decade. This period has seen ballooning levels of public debt and government deficits, bringing calls to end the 'national development state' and to reform the country into a mature, services-oriented, consumption-driven economy more in tune with its dominant ally, the US.
Government bets on an improved higher ed sector
Despite such difficulties, the national government has remained committed to subsidizing higher education because it falls under both education and science. Much hope for reform of Japan's society and political economy is pinned on improvements in these two areas.
Somewhere between 8-10% of the annual national budget goes to the category of 'education and science'. Statements of exact amounts for the past decade vary by year, source, definitions, and exchange rates, but this 'super category' of expenditure can be estimated to be perennially over US$ 60 billion. Again, depending upon definitions, all forms of education that are post-secondary probably receive close to 40% of this, an amount that could be put at close to US$ 25 billion.
The national government also subsidizes education and higher education through its revenue sharing and tax grants to local government. Local governments nationwide spend about double the amount the national government does on school education, but higher education only captures about 7% of this. Much of this goes to fund the country's 86 public (prefectural or metropolitan) universities.
Former national universities to drive scientific R&D--and economic growth
Another prominent goal has been to spend an amount of public funds on scientific research and development at a level of 1% of GDP. This has benefited universities with research laboratories and centers, especially those within the national university system of 87 institutions. This commitment to scientific research matches in size the 1 - 1.5% of GDP that is annually put towards higher education in total from both public and private sources.
Japan's political economy is structured around a centralized national government, which exerts control across the entire country from the top on down to the lowest of government. The higher education sector is no exception.
American-style accreditation is not yet a major factor in quality assurance. Institutions can issue degrees, certificates and diplomas only because the national government approves and certifies them. The government also sets enrollment quotas for all certified universities and colleges.
In the case of national institutions, the quotas determine the size of bloc grants disbursed annually in support of taught programs. In effect, this means that the top university in Japan, the University of Tokyo, receives the same amount per student from bloc grants as do the handful of tiny national teachers' colleges.
NUCs are born
With an act of legislation that took effect in October 2003, Japan's national universities were re-chartered. Effective 1 April 2004, each university became a national university corporation (NUC). The NUCs are being weaned from annual bloc grants by a reduction of 1% per year. However, they are allowed to raise their tuition fees by a maximum of 10%. This means that eventually the NUCs will charge rates that are similar to private universities. Private institutions make up around 75% of higher education, and their average annual tuition fees of around US$7,400 are about 35% higher than those at national or public institutions.
Can the newly born NUCs adjust and even thrive?
In the next decade, NUCs must scramble to shift their finances to the business operations of their school corporations, deriving funding from the sort of mix that private universities and colleges have long had to live with--higher tuition fees, donations, investments, and revenue-raising activities. Meanwhile, as the NUCs guaranteed share of national education funding is reduced, private universities are sure to increase their efforts to compete for the national funds that are being offered to create an elite 30 world-class universities.
04 February 2008
Japan and Malaysia to establish a joint university of technology
Japan and Malaysia to establish a joint university of technology
by Charles Jannuzi
Introduction
In late August 2007, Japan's then-prime minister, Shinzo Abe, was in Malaysia on an official three-day visit for bilateral talks with his Malaysian counterpart, PM Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. The meetings in Putrajaya, the new planned city and government center of Malaysia , marked both the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two Asian nations and the 25th anniversary of Malaysia's 'Look East Policy'. A joint statement from the PMs for the occasion announced a renewed call for the rapid establishment of the Malaysia-Japan International University of Technology (MJIUT).
However, after only one troubled year in office, the sudden collapse of the Abe government on 12 September 2007 has cast serious doubts about the future of the MJIUT. This is a project which so far has seemed to elude any realistic schedules for completion or even cost estimates. The utter lack of specifics on time and money is not at all encouraging for the start up of a new science and technology university, since such an institution is so capital intensive and requires expensive equipment, highly trained personnel, and a career structure for its academics.
Hopeful statements, but...
Just where does the project stand in the list of priorities of the hastily formed government of new Japan PM Yasuo Fukuda? The signals being sent seem somewhat encouraging. As reported in October 2007 by the official news agency of Malaysia, Masahiko Horie, Japan's new ambassador appointee to Malaysia, has stated that a major goal of his tenure is the completion of the new university. He reiterated that the completion of the institution will be a high priority for his term as ambassador during a trip to Penang last month (January 2008).
An international symposium in Kuala Lumpur on 12-15 November 2007 was held to promote cooperative research in advanced technology between Japan and Malaysia in support of the new university's establishment. Still, since the Ambassador Horie has given no specific guidance on budgets or realistic targets for stages of completion (other than the goal of opening by mid-2009), the Malaysian side must be hoping his tenure is longer than his predecessor's one year under Abe.
Flagship project for the 'Asian Gateway' Concept
Over the past two years, the MJIUT has been promoted as a 'flagship' project ushering in a new era of expanded economic and cultural ties between Japan and SE Asia, including the vital trade partner and newly industrialized country, Malaysia. For example, the joint university project was supposed to exemplify the benefits of bilateral trade liberalization and harmonization of the Japan-Malaysia Economic Partnership Agreement, which went into effect in July 2006.
Of course such projects can sell the benefits of the many bilateral free trade agreements Japan has been reaching with countries in ASEAN and worldwide. But the origins of the MJIUT go back to November 2001 at the the ASEAN+3 Summit in Brunei, where then Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad proposed the project during talks with then Prime Minister of Japan, Junichiro Koizumi. PM Mahathir, nearing the end of his long reign as a dominant figure in Malaysian and SE Asian politics, was seeking ways to make his legacy in education and social development more lasting while taking his leadership vision to other parts of Asia. At the same time, PM Koizumi, only just starting out, needed to be seen as an effective leader of reform and renewal in Japan. Therefore Mahathir's brainchild proved appealing to both countries' governments and was the envy of other ASEAN nations seeking more Japanese involvement in their development plans.
Predictions for opening dates keep receding
Reports that the MJIUT would be operating sometime in the period 2004-8 have proven, predictably enough, wrong. Even the new target of June 2009 now seems out of reach. For a start, official statements about the proposal at the initial stages gave way to wishful thinking regarding the condition of Japan's government finances or the management expertise of a consortium of Japanese universities and their academics assigned to this project. Also, Japan's overseas development aid (10% of which goes to education) began to decline severely while Koizumi was PM, both in total yen amounts (because of the need to control government borrowing) and in purchasing power (because of the weak yen). Moreover, advocates of the initiative may have underestimated the difficulty in overcoming language barriers and cultural differences between the two sponsoring nations.
Still, there has been some progress on the ground. In December 2005 the City Campus (KL) of the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM) became host to the Malaysia-Japan University Center (MJUC). This center has functioned as the start-up form of the new university. A small group of Japanese academics from the Japan university consortium has been assigned to this center while Malaysian officials administer it. Its mission is to spearhead the planning and building of the new university.
Location somewhere in the Klang Valley
Meanwhile the burden of financing the ambitious project is shifting from joint government sponsorship to a mix of public and private funds coming from consortia set up in both countries. These consortia consist of government ministries, associating universities, and companies, including ones that may be exploring opportunities in for-profit education provision. If construction does begin, the most likely location would be a greenfield site south of crowded and expensive K. L., in the towns of Nilai or Enstek or some similar location in the 'Klang Valley' (a descriptive term that can take in quite a bit of real estate). These towns are said to form a 'knowledge valley', home to a growing group of institutions of higher learning and research, including Nilai International University College, INTI International University College, Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia, and Islamic University College Malaysia. In addition to having the MJIUT, the Nilai area, because it is centrally located relative to KL, the international airport, Putrayjaya, and Cyberjaya, has also been designated as the future host for similar technical institutes to be run jointly with interests from S. Korea and Taiwan.
Good time for a tie-up for HE in both Japan and Malaysia
An unprecedented public-private tie-up between Japan and Malaysia to run a major transnational science and technology university could not come at a better time for the higher education systems of both countries.
Japan's 700+ universities and four-year colleges are struggling to meet their government-set enrollment quotas. The population of senior high school graduates peaked over a decade ago and its current size, just over one million, is still in decline. With about 50% of this cohort continuing to university or college, Japan's large higher education system of about 1250 degree-granting institutions has entered an era of open admissions and intense competition to admit the best students. To help meet the shortfalls in enrollment from the domestic population, universities and colleges have turned increasingly to students from overseas. International students are close to 120,000, but their numbers peaked several years ago and have been falling.
This year the Japanese government called for a renewed drive to internationalize the universities while keeping enrollments up, requesting that the number of foreign students be increased to an extremely ambitious 350,000 by 2025. Of the international students now in Japan, by far the single largest national group is from China, followed by S. Korea and Taiwan. Students from Malaysia, like ASEAN neighbor and rival, Thailand, form a much smaller but significant group of about 2% of the 120,000 internationals studying in Japan. Numbers from China are inflated by many who are doing relatively short-term Japanese language study. Those from Malaysia are sponsored by their own government to stay and complete two- and four-year degrees. Degrees issued in Japan and Malaysia are now recognized in both countries.
Following a pattern set with a number of foreign institutions from Anglophone countries operating branch campuses in Malaysia, the proposed MJIUT might educate students for two years in country and then have them finish their four-year degrees by spending the last two years at the universities in Japan that are members of the sponsoring university consortium. Some of the successful graduates might then stay on at universities in Japan to complete graduate program or enter careers with Japanese companies operating in SE Asia.
Malaysia has been frustrated by a lack of representation in international and Asian rankings of universities. So clearly the hope is that an infusion of money and technological know-how from the E. Asian trade surplus giants of Japan, S. Korea and Taiwan will boost the country's fortunes in globalizing its expanding higher education system. Because of their developed systems (as well as language barriers), these countries send few students abroad to study in science and technology. If language and cultural differences can be overcome (major issues that can not be overestimated) , the thinking is Japan and its national development state apprentices, S. Korea and Taiwan, should be able to export science and technology education to Malaysia.
Could Malaysia become SE Asia's #1 HE hub?
The Malaysian government would like to see its higher education sector compete with Singapore to become the dominant hub of SE Asia. Prime Minister Abdullah recently called for the current number of 50,000 international students to be doubled to 100,000 by 2010. The majority of foreign students in Malaysia (over 60%) are enrolled in private (and even private, for-profit) institutions. Technical institutes and universities with connections to corporations, research institutes and higher education in Japan, S. Korea and Taiwan would certainly prove attractive to a large number of students under-served in populous China, India, Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand. Moreover, Malaysia may well prove to have the edge over Singapore in terms of physical space, cost, and potential for future immigration. Cultural and religious affinities can not be dismissed.
Malaysia's main rival for hub status is the city state of Singapore. Compared to Malaysia, it is tiny, crowded, expensive, and closed to most immigration. Its close military relationships with the US and Israel do little for its image in much of the world. Compared to sprawling, resource-rich Malaysia, Singapore may lack appeal to the growing number of young people from the Islamic world, namely nearby Indonesia (the world's most populous majority Muslim country), but also the Muslim parts of Thailand and the Philippines as well as Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the affluent Gulf States. Also, Malaysia's higher education system already has significant numbers of students from W. and N. Africa.
by Charles Jannuzi
Introduction
In late August 2007, Japan's then-prime minister, Shinzo Abe, was in Malaysia on an official three-day visit for bilateral talks with his Malaysian counterpart, PM Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. The meetings in Putrajaya, the new planned city and government center of Malaysia , marked both the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two Asian nations and the 25th anniversary of Malaysia's 'Look East Policy'. A joint statement from the PMs for the occasion announced a renewed call for the rapid establishment of the Malaysia-Japan International University of Technology (MJIUT).
However, after only one troubled year in office, the sudden collapse of the Abe government on 12 September 2007 has cast serious doubts about the future of the MJIUT. This is a project which so far has seemed to elude any realistic schedules for completion or even cost estimates. The utter lack of specifics on time and money is not at all encouraging for the start up of a new science and technology university, since such an institution is so capital intensive and requires expensive equipment, highly trained personnel, and a career structure for its academics.
Hopeful statements, but...
Just where does the project stand in the list of priorities of the hastily formed government of new Japan PM Yasuo Fukuda? The signals being sent seem somewhat encouraging. As reported in October 2007 by the official news agency of Malaysia, Masahiko Horie, Japan's new ambassador appointee to Malaysia, has stated that a major goal of his tenure is the completion of the new university. He reiterated that the completion of the institution will be a high priority for his term as ambassador during a trip to Penang last month (January 2008).
An international symposium in Kuala Lumpur on 12-15 November 2007 was held to promote cooperative research in advanced technology between Japan and Malaysia in support of the new university's establishment. Still, since the Ambassador Horie has given no specific guidance on budgets or realistic targets for stages of completion (other than the goal of opening by mid-2009), the Malaysian side must be hoping his tenure is longer than his predecessor's one year under Abe.
Flagship project for the 'Asian Gateway' Concept
Over the past two years, the MJIUT has been promoted as a 'flagship' project ushering in a new era of expanded economic and cultural ties between Japan and SE Asia, including the vital trade partner and newly industrialized country, Malaysia. For example, the joint university project was supposed to exemplify the benefits of bilateral trade liberalization and harmonization of the Japan-Malaysia Economic Partnership Agreement, which went into effect in July 2006.
Of course such projects can sell the benefits of the many bilateral free trade agreements Japan has been reaching with countries in ASEAN and worldwide. But the origins of the MJIUT go back to November 2001 at the the ASEAN+3 Summit in Brunei, where then Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad proposed the project during talks with then Prime Minister of Japan, Junichiro Koizumi. PM Mahathir, nearing the end of his long reign as a dominant figure in Malaysian and SE Asian politics, was seeking ways to make his legacy in education and social development more lasting while taking his leadership vision to other parts of Asia. At the same time, PM Koizumi, only just starting out, needed to be seen as an effective leader of reform and renewal in Japan. Therefore Mahathir's brainchild proved appealing to both countries' governments and was the envy of other ASEAN nations seeking more Japanese involvement in their development plans.
Predictions for opening dates keep receding
Reports that the MJIUT would be operating sometime in the period 2004-8 have proven, predictably enough, wrong. Even the new target of June 2009 now seems out of reach. For a start, official statements about the proposal at the initial stages gave way to wishful thinking regarding the condition of Japan's government finances or the management expertise of a consortium of Japanese universities and their academics assigned to this project. Also, Japan's overseas development aid (10% of which goes to education) began to decline severely while Koizumi was PM, both in total yen amounts (because of the need to control government borrowing) and in purchasing power (because of the weak yen). Moreover, advocates of the initiative may have underestimated the difficulty in overcoming language barriers and cultural differences between the two sponsoring nations.
Still, there has been some progress on the ground. In December 2005 the City Campus (KL) of the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM) became host to the Malaysia-Japan University Center (MJUC). This center has functioned as the start-up form of the new university. A small group of Japanese academics from the Japan university consortium has been assigned to this center while Malaysian officials administer it. Its mission is to spearhead the planning and building of the new university.
Location somewhere in the Klang Valley
Meanwhile the burden of financing the ambitious project is shifting from joint government sponsorship to a mix of public and private funds coming from consortia set up in both countries. These consortia consist of government ministries, associating universities, and companies, including ones that may be exploring opportunities in for-profit education provision. If construction does begin, the most likely location would be a greenfield site south of crowded and expensive K. L., in the towns of Nilai or Enstek or some similar location in the 'Klang Valley' (a descriptive term that can take in quite a bit of real estate). These towns are said to form a 'knowledge valley', home to a growing group of institutions of higher learning and research, including Nilai International University College, INTI International University College, Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia, and Islamic University College Malaysia. In addition to having the MJIUT, the Nilai area, because it is centrally located relative to KL, the international airport, Putrayjaya, and Cyberjaya, has also been designated as the future host for similar technical institutes to be run jointly with interests from S. Korea and Taiwan.
Good time for a tie-up for HE in both Japan and Malaysia
An unprecedented public-private tie-up between Japan and Malaysia to run a major transnational science and technology university could not come at a better time for the higher education systems of both countries.
Japan's 700+ universities and four-year colleges are struggling to meet their government-set enrollment quotas. The population of senior high school graduates peaked over a decade ago and its current size, just over one million, is still in decline. With about 50% of this cohort continuing to university or college, Japan's large higher education system of about 1250 degree-granting institutions has entered an era of open admissions and intense competition to admit the best students. To help meet the shortfalls in enrollment from the domestic population, universities and colleges have turned increasingly to students from overseas. International students are close to 120,000, but their numbers peaked several years ago and have been falling.
This year the Japanese government called for a renewed drive to internationalize the universities while keeping enrollments up, requesting that the number of foreign students be increased to an extremely ambitious 350,000 by 2025. Of the international students now in Japan, by far the single largest national group is from China, followed by S. Korea and Taiwan. Students from Malaysia, like ASEAN neighbor and rival, Thailand, form a much smaller but significant group of about 2% of the 120,000 internationals studying in Japan. Numbers from China are inflated by many who are doing relatively short-term Japanese language study. Those from Malaysia are sponsored by their own government to stay and complete two- and four-year degrees. Degrees issued in Japan and Malaysia are now recognized in both countries.
Following a pattern set with a number of foreign institutions from Anglophone countries operating branch campuses in Malaysia, the proposed MJIUT might educate students for two years in country and then have them finish their four-year degrees by spending the last two years at the universities in Japan that are members of the sponsoring university consortium. Some of the successful graduates might then stay on at universities in Japan to complete graduate program or enter careers with Japanese companies operating in SE Asia.
Malaysia has been frustrated by a lack of representation in international and Asian rankings of universities. So clearly the hope is that an infusion of money and technological know-how from the E. Asian trade surplus giants of Japan, S. Korea and Taiwan will boost the country's fortunes in globalizing its expanding higher education system. Because of their developed systems (as well as language barriers), these countries send few students abroad to study in science and technology. If language and cultural differences can be overcome (major issues that can not be overestimated) , the thinking is Japan and its national development state apprentices, S. Korea and Taiwan, should be able to export science and technology education to Malaysia.
Could Malaysia become SE Asia's #1 HE hub?
The Malaysian government would like to see its higher education sector compete with Singapore to become the dominant hub of SE Asia. Prime Minister Abdullah recently called for the current number of 50,000 international students to be doubled to 100,000 by 2010. The majority of foreign students in Malaysia (over 60%) are enrolled in private (and even private, for-profit) institutions. Technical institutes and universities with connections to corporations, research institutes and higher education in Japan, S. Korea and Taiwan would certainly prove attractive to a large number of students under-served in populous China, India, Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand. Moreover, Malaysia may well prove to have the edge over Singapore in terms of physical space, cost, and potential for future immigration. Cultural and religious affinities can not be dismissed.
Malaysia's main rival for hub status is the city state of Singapore. Compared to Malaysia, it is tiny, crowded, expensive, and closed to most immigration. Its close military relationships with the US and Israel do little for its image in much of the world. Compared to sprawling, resource-rich Malaysia, Singapore may lack appeal to the growing number of young people from the Islamic world, namely nearby Indonesia (the world's most populous majority Muslim country), but also the Muslim parts of Thailand and the Philippines as well as Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the affluent Gulf States. Also, Malaysia's higher education system already has significant numbers of students from W. and N. Africa.
03 February 2008
An extended look at academic freedom in HE in Japan
Academic freedom in Japan's higher education--a more in-depth look
by Charles Jannuzi
Introduction
Many attempts at analyzing the nature of government in post-war Japan tend to emphasize continuity with 'old' Japan and its conservative nationalism. However, such analysis does not insightfully refer to tendencies that are ancient or even old by historical standards. Instead, any connection with past rule has to be made with early modern Japan, from the start of the Meiji era (1868) to the start of the second world war.
Sweeping political, social and cultural changes in the last half of the 19th century opened up Japan to outside ideas, knowledge and technology. The Meiji Restoration of 1868 was actually a political revolution which swept away most elements of the old shogunate government and its prestige culture. New factions of elites capable of leadership and rule emerged during a time of great social unrest and change.
Some historical background
Under the guise of restoring an emperor, they established a constitutional monarchy which then oversaw the laws and policies of early modern Japan of the Meiji and Taishou eras (1868-1927). Enlightenment-inspired moves toward pluralism and democracy were checked by a government headed and run by the survivors of a political and social revolution. They gave top priority to retaining and expanding their power through institutionalizing a national culture of unity and by pushing for the all-out industrial development of the country.
From the very beginning of modern Japan, a tightly controlled education system at the primary and lower secondary (middle school) levels was instituted to help effect conformance to a national culture and manage top-down control of social change and development. On the other hand, a relatively lighter, more liberal touch to the upper levels (upper secondary, normal schools for teacher training, tertiary) was thought vital to assure that these levels expanded in terms of facilities and trained staff. Teachers at this level required sufficient academic freedom to assure advanced learning in scientific and technical subjects.
Relative academic freedom brought with it deep obligations: Access to the top parts of the higher education system was supposed to be granted only to a tested, loyal, meritocratic elite deemed capable and selfless enough to run a modernized Japan. All teachers took on the status of civil servants of the imperial state. Even teachers at the numerous, privately run high schools and colleges could be characterized as 'quasi-civil servants'.
For nationalists in the Meiji and Taishou periods, the desires of the individual had to be subordinated to the needs of the traditional household, legitimate civil government, and the national development state. Rights such as freedoms of speech, conscience, and assembly were not so much positive rights as they were limited privileges granted to loyal subjects by the government, at the top of which sat the emperor.
Still, in the period from the Meiji Restoration up through the 1920s, the Japanese version of academic freedom was considered vital to intellectual inquiry and scientific progress--key components of national development. The fight for academic freedom resulted in some victories when university professors criticized government policy and survived calls for their dismissal. Up to the end of the Taishou era (1912-26), most professors and lecturers singled out for expressing 'dangerous thoughts' (usually about the government or the emperor) were allowed to retain their posts.
Typically, those who got into trouble had tried to use modern social science to analyze the imperial system or its related religion, 'state Shinto'. Though most academics were not this brave, the few scholars who were might lose their academic posts and face severe ostracism. At least in terms of punishment, the only offense that could be worse would be to pursue Marxist analysis. Marxists could be imprisoned.
From the late 1920s onwards, Japan slid increasingly into authoritarian rule and militarism. University professors could be forced to resign their positions and find their works banned.
Post-war Japan--rupture or continuity?
One argument says that the overwhelming loss and destruction of the war, combined with American occupation and reconstruction, led to a total rupture from early modern Japan. The argument then continues that this embrace of American concepts of government, society, and individual rights re-created Japan as Asia's most liberal, western nation, with a war-renouncing constitution to keep things that way.
An opposing view, however, holds that conservative-nationalist resistance to outside power helped much less liberal elements re-assert control over the political economy of Japan. The conclusion of this interpretation of post-war Japan is that human rights are not well-protected, especially for anyone or any group not viewed as 'Japanese'.
Academic freedom, a positive right in the constitution
Academic freedom is now firmly established as a positive right in Japan. It has been since the Occupation government promulgated what many legal scholars and historians have described as a 'liberal' and 'enlightened' constitution in 1946. This document, along with fundamental laws creating a somewhat Americanized education system, took effect in 1947, a year when most Japanese were desperately struggling to feed, clothe, and house themselves.
In the constitution, academic freedom took its place alongside the more commonly stated rights of 'freedom of speech', 'thought', 'conscience', 'assembly' and 'association'. Chapter III (Rights and Duties), Article 23 states, 'Academic freedom is guaranteed.' Academic freedom exists undeniably as a 'positive' right in constitutional law. The question is, Has it become a right in practice, such as through case law (legal precedents) in favor of wronged academics and enlightened institutional policies?
In higher education, a national system of control under the ministry of education prevails, although it is nowhere near as complete as the government hold on primary and secondary education. Nationalist conservatives (including so-called independent 'reformers') have run the central government since the end of the occupation, with only two short-lived socialist intervals.
This exposes Japan's academia as somewhat left of the politicians who head the government that attempts to oversee and subsidize endeavors in research, scholarship, and teaching.
In addition to providing continuity, bureaucrats in the ministry of education act as a buffer between university academics and politicians because overall they hold a wider ranging set of philosophies and opinions on education and universities than the elected and appointed leadership.
If academic freedom is looked at from the perspective of freedom to teach, do scholarship or research within a specialty, then academics at national and public universities in Japan are given considerable latitude. They do not have to conform to a national curriculum or use ministry-approved textbooks. Compared to corporate researchers, many at universities and national research centers can pursue pure research and abstract theory, regardless of immediate applications or returns on investment.
Academic freedom and labor policies
Most cases that concern, at least in part, 'academic freedom' in Japan play themselves out in labor negotiations, case arbitration, and the courts. This is because academic freedom is often said to be violated when universities and their program are accused of not giving a justifiable reason when demoting, financially penalizing, firing, dismissing or not renewing the contract of teaching or research personnel.
Unless tasked with administrative and committees, some academics get to spend most of their time doing research and scholarship. The national universities especially are staffed with large numbers of people whose main job is somehow connected to research, not teaching.
Other academics get to teach advanced-level courses using the content they prefer (no matter how idiosyncratic), running small seminars for upper-level undergraduates and graduate students that are much closer to the sort of narrow specialties that scholarly academics prefer. If a university teacher of this second type demonstrates enough success at research and scholarship at a specialty, he or she may be given the chance to join the group who do little or no teaching.
A third type of faculty consists of those who have to do most of the lower-level teaching, right down to the so-called 'service' courses of general education required of first and second year students. This system is filled out by large numbers of part-time teachers usually teaching in general education as well. People in this third lower tier are most often involved in claims over breach of the right of academic freedom. While they tend to have much less academic freedom because of the constraints of their teaching assignments, they are also the most likely to have their salaries cut or their positions reassigned or terminated.
Troubles at Tokyo Metropolitan University
Take the example of Tokyo Metropolitan University, the highest-ranking public (not national) university in Japan Because of troubled finances at many local governments, starting in 2005, public universities (86 total) were put into process of consolidating and corporatizing along the lines of the national universities (all 87 were corporatized in the period 2003-4).
The Tokyo Metropolitan Government had been proposing since 2003 the establishment of a new public university corporation through been the consolidation of four existing institutions into one: the Tokyo Metropolitan Institute of Technology, Tokyo Metropolitan University of Health Sciences, and Tokyo Metropolitan College were supposed to be merged with the prestigious Tokyo Metropolitan University.
Many of the faculty at the institutions affected have objected vociferously to the proposed imposition of performance-based pay and five-year contracts. Those who objected also refused to sign agreements for course assignments, which the administration needed in order to apply to the national government for approval in establishing the re-chartered public university corporation.
The 100 professors and lecturers who have refused to agree to re-assignment demanded, among other things, that faculty councils retain control of teaching appointments and that full-time teachers not be forced to submit to the five-year contracts. Many in the current faculties object to the proposed heavier load of introductory level classes with larger numbers of students to teach and evaluate. They understandably wish to avoid being put into that third tier of contractual or provisionally employed teachers.
Although the national universities were forced to lead the way in privatization and corporatization, the plan to combine public institutions in Tokyo is considered a model case which could be applied as 'best practice' for management in the reorganization and streamlining of both public and former national universities nationwide. The proposals for 3-5-year contracts and merit pay for teachers have drawn special attention.
Actually, the contract-merit system that the Tokyo Metropolitan government is now attempting to impose on the teaching faculties of its universities and colleges comes from a plan put forward at national research centers and at the former national universities in order to 'invigorate' government-funded research. It most likely originates from private industry and private universities (who were the first to use merit-based contracts for educators).
This is the so-called 'tokunin' system whereby researchers sign contracts (often five years for researchers, but often three years for teachers). Renewal--leading to a possible career track position--depends upon a review process and successful results, such as the development of patents and commercial applications stemming from the initial period of research. However, it is questionable whether such a system is the most appropriate for the professional development of university teachers, nor is it clear how their performance under such a 'tokunin' system can be effectively and objectively evaluated.
The goings-on at national universities
The administrations of former national universities (now National University Corporations or NUCs), however, have appeared to be reluctant to propose such a system for MOST of their teaching personnel. That reluctance changed only recently, and the largely powerless foreign lecturers became precedent-setting example. For example, as of April 2005, University of Kobe, a former national university, adopted a contract system for its foreign lecturers, limiting them to a three-year contract and no automatic renewals (though they would be allowed to compete for the position should it be re-opened to new candidates).
Private universities and the plight of foreign nationals
The policies and practices that affect the academic freedom and employment rights of foreign nationals within Japan's extensive private system of universities and two-year colleges (together totaling 984 institutions) vary so much as to make concise generalizations nearly impossible. It is an understatement to say that a broad range of situations is possible.
At one extreme, discrimination is obviously rampant: unlike their full-time Japanese counterparts, who have not been forced onto contracts, foreign personnel at many private universities and colleges might (1) face arbitrary dismissal, (2) have one- or three-year contracts with strict renewal limits imposed, (3) receive lower salaries, no bonuses and higher pay cuts, (4) be barred from meetings where decisions are made, and (5) be denied health insurance and retirement benefits (since employers try to avoid bearing their share of the fees for the national scheme).
Any charge of nationwide discrimination, however, has to be qualified because the administrations of some private universities and colleges are so dictatorial and their unions so weak that even Japanese nationals can face similarly severe employment conditions and unfair labor practices. Moreover, the very numerous part-time personnel--who often do more teaching than full-time faculty, regardless of nationality--have very little control over their job situations and fewer employment rights or benefits.
by Charles Jannuzi
Introduction
Many attempts at analyzing the nature of government in post-war Japan tend to emphasize continuity with 'old' Japan and its conservative nationalism. However, such analysis does not insightfully refer to tendencies that are ancient or even old by historical standards. Instead, any connection with past rule has to be made with early modern Japan, from the start of the Meiji era (1868) to the start of the second world war.
Sweeping political, social and cultural changes in the last half of the 19th century opened up Japan to outside ideas, knowledge and technology. The Meiji Restoration of 1868 was actually a political revolution which swept away most elements of the old shogunate government and its prestige culture. New factions of elites capable of leadership and rule emerged during a time of great social unrest and change.
Some historical background
Under the guise of restoring an emperor, they established a constitutional monarchy which then oversaw the laws and policies of early modern Japan of the Meiji and Taishou eras (1868-1927). Enlightenment-inspired moves toward pluralism and democracy were checked by a government headed and run by the survivors of a political and social revolution. They gave top priority to retaining and expanding their power through institutionalizing a national culture of unity and by pushing for the all-out industrial development of the country.
From the very beginning of modern Japan, a tightly controlled education system at the primary and lower secondary (middle school) levels was instituted to help effect conformance to a national culture and manage top-down control of social change and development. On the other hand, a relatively lighter, more liberal touch to the upper levels (upper secondary, normal schools for teacher training, tertiary) was thought vital to assure that these levels expanded in terms of facilities and trained staff. Teachers at this level required sufficient academic freedom to assure advanced learning in scientific and technical subjects.
Relative academic freedom brought with it deep obligations: Access to the top parts of the higher education system was supposed to be granted only to a tested, loyal, meritocratic elite deemed capable and selfless enough to run a modernized Japan. All teachers took on the status of civil servants of the imperial state. Even teachers at the numerous, privately run high schools and colleges could be characterized as 'quasi-civil servants'.
For nationalists in the Meiji and Taishou periods, the desires of the individual had to be subordinated to the needs of the traditional household, legitimate civil government, and the national development state. Rights such as freedoms of speech, conscience, and assembly were not so much positive rights as they were limited privileges granted to loyal subjects by the government, at the top of which sat the emperor.
Still, in the period from the Meiji Restoration up through the 1920s, the Japanese version of academic freedom was considered vital to intellectual inquiry and scientific progress--key components of national development. The fight for academic freedom resulted in some victories when university professors criticized government policy and survived calls for their dismissal. Up to the end of the Taishou era (1912-26), most professors and lecturers singled out for expressing 'dangerous thoughts' (usually about the government or the emperor) were allowed to retain their posts.
Typically, those who got into trouble had tried to use modern social science to analyze the imperial system or its related religion, 'state Shinto'. Though most academics were not this brave, the few scholars who were might lose their academic posts and face severe ostracism. At least in terms of punishment, the only offense that could be worse would be to pursue Marxist analysis. Marxists could be imprisoned.
From the late 1920s onwards, Japan slid increasingly into authoritarian rule and militarism. University professors could be forced to resign their positions and find their works banned.
Post-war Japan--rupture or continuity?
One argument says that the overwhelming loss and destruction of the war, combined with American occupation and reconstruction, led to a total rupture from early modern Japan. The argument then continues that this embrace of American concepts of government, society, and individual rights re-created Japan as Asia's most liberal, western nation, with a war-renouncing constitution to keep things that way.
An opposing view, however, holds that conservative-nationalist resistance to outside power helped much less liberal elements re-assert control over the political economy of Japan. The conclusion of this interpretation of post-war Japan is that human rights are not well-protected, especially for anyone or any group not viewed as 'Japanese'.
Academic freedom, a positive right in the constitution
Academic freedom is now firmly established as a positive right in Japan. It has been since the Occupation government promulgated what many legal scholars and historians have described as a 'liberal' and 'enlightened' constitution in 1946. This document, along with fundamental laws creating a somewhat Americanized education system, took effect in 1947, a year when most Japanese were desperately struggling to feed, clothe, and house themselves.
In the constitution, academic freedom took its place alongside the more commonly stated rights of 'freedom of speech', 'thought', 'conscience', 'assembly' and 'association'. Chapter III (Rights and Duties), Article 23 states, 'Academic freedom is guaranteed.' Academic freedom exists undeniably as a 'positive' right in constitutional law. The question is, Has it become a right in practice, such as through case law (legal precedents) in favor of wronged academics and enlightened institutional policies?
In higher education, a national system of control under the ministry of education prevails, although it is nowhere near as complete as the government hold on primary and secondary education. Nationalist conservatives (including so-called independent 'reformers') have run the central government since the end of the occupation, with only two short-lived socialist intervals.
This exposes Japan's academia as somewhat left of the politicians who head the government that attempts to oversee and subsidize endeavors in research, scholarship, and teaching.
In addition to providing continuity, bureaucrats in the ministry of education act as a buffer between university academics and politicians because overall they hold a wider ranging set of philosophies and opinions on education and universities than the elected and appointed leadership.
If academic freedom is looked at from the perspective of freedom to teach, do scholarship or research within a specialty, then academics at national and public universities in Japan are given considerable latitude. They do not have to conform to a national curriculum or use ministry-approved textbooks. Compared to corporate researchers, many at universities and national research centers can pursue pure research and abstract theory, regardless of immediate applications or returns on investment.
Academic freedom and labor policies
Most cases that concern, at least in part, 'academic freedom' in Japan play themselves out in labor negotiations, case arbitration, and the courts. This is because academic freedom is often said to be violated when universities and their program are accused of not giving a justifiable reason when demoting, financially penalizing, firing, dismissing or not renewing the contract of teaching or research personnel.
Unless tasked with administrative and committees, some academics get to spend most of their time doing research and scholarship. The national universities especially are staffed with large numbers of people whose main job is somehow connected to research, not teaching.
Other academics get to teach advanced-level courses using the content they prefer (no matter how idiosyncratic), running small seminars for upper-level undergraduates and graduate students that are much closer to the sort of narrow specialties that scholarly academics prefer. If a university teacher of this second type demonstrates enough success at research and scholarship at a specialty, he or she may be given the chance to join the group who do little or no teaching.
A third type of faculty consists of those who have to do most of the lower-level teaching, right down to the so-called 'service' courses of general education required of first and second year students. This system is filled out by large numbers of part-time teachers usually teaching in general education as well. People in this third lower tier are most often involved in claims over breach of the right of academic freedom. While they tend to have much less academic freedom because of the constraints of their teaching assignments, they are also the most likely to have their salaries cut or their positions reassigned or terminated.
Troubles at Tokyo Metropolitan University
Take the example of Tokyo Metropolitan University, the highest-ranking public (not national) university in Japan Because of troubled finances at many local governments, starting in 2005, public universities (86 total) were put into process of consolidating and corporatizing along the lines of the national universities (all 87 were corporatized in the period 2003-4).
The Tokyo Metropolitan Government had been proposing since 2003 the establishment of a new public university corporation through been the consolidation of four existing institutions into one: the Tokyo Metropolitan Institute of Technology, Tokyo Metropolitan University of Health Sciences, and Tokyo Metropolitan College were supposed to be merged with the prestigious Tokyo Metropolitan University.
Many of the faculty at the institutions affected have objected vociferously to the proposed imposition of performance-based pay and five-year contracts. Those who objected also refused to sign agreements for course assignments, which the administration needed in order to apply to the national government for approval in establishing the re-chartered public university corporation.
The 100 professors and lecturers who have refused to agree to re-assignment demanded, among other things, that faculty councils retain control of teaching appointments and that full-time teachers not be forced to submit to the five-year contracts. Many in the current faculties object to the proposed heavier load of introductory level classes with larger numbers of students to teach and evaluate. They understandably wish to avoid being put into that third tier of contractual or provisionally employed teachers.
Although the national universities were forced to lead the way in privatization and corporatization, the plan to combine public institutions in Tokyo is considered a model case which could be applied as 'best practice' for management in the reorganization and streamlining of both public and former national universities nationwide. The proposals for 3-5-year contracts and merit pay for teachers have drawn special attention.
Actually, the contract-merit system that the Tokyo Metropolitan government is now attempting to impose on the teaching faculties of its universities and colleges comes from a plan put forward at national research centers and at the former national universities in order to 'invigorate' government-funded research. It most likely originates from private industry and private universities (who were the first to use merit-based contracts for educators).
This is the so-called 'tokunin' system whereby researchers sign contracts (often five years for researchers, but often three years for teachers). Renewal--leading to a possible career track position--depends upon a review process and successful results, such as the development of patents and commercial applications stemming from the initial period of research. However, it is questionable whether such a system is the most appropriate for the professional development of university teachers, nor is it clear how their performance under such a 'tokunin' system can be effectively and objectively evaluated.
The goings-on at national universities
The administrations of former national universities (now National University Corporations or NUCs), however, have appeared to be reluctant to propose such a system for MOST of their teaching personnel. That reluctance changed only recently, and the largely powerless foreign lecturers became precedent-setting example. For example, as of April 2005, University of Kobe, a former national university, adopted a contract system for its foreign lecturers, limiting them to a three-year contract and no automatic renewals (though they would be allowed to compete for the position should it be re-opened to new candidates).
Private universities and the plight of foreign nationals
The policies and practices that affect the academic freedom and employment rights of foreign nationals within Japan's extensive private system of universities and two-year colleges (together totaling 984 institutions) vary so much as to make concise generalizations nearly impossible. It is an understatement to say that a broad range of situations is possible.
At one extreme, discrimination is obviously rampant: unlike their full-time Japanese counterparts, who have not been forced onto contracts, foreign personnel at many private universities and colleges might (1) face arbitrary dismissal, (2) have one- or three-year contracts with strict renewal limits imposed, (3) receive lower salaries, no bonuses and higher pay cuts, (4) be barred from meetings where decisions are made, and (5) be denied health insurance and retirement benefits (since employers try to avoid bearing their share of the fees for the national scheme).
Any charge of nationwide discrimination, however, has to be qualified because the administrations of some private universities and colleges are so dictatorial and their unions so weak that even Japanese nationals can face similarly severe employment conditions and unfair labor practices. Moreover, the very numerous part-time personnel--who often do more teaching than full-time faculty, regardless of nationality--have very little control over their job situations and fewer employment rights or benefits.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Back to top
Click on logo to go back to top page.